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Article 1

Is There a Constitutional Right to
Clone?
by
CASS R. SUNSTEIN*

Introduction
As currently interpreted, the Constitution protects a range of
fights involving marriage, bodily integrity, and reproduction. Does
the Constitution guarantee the right to clone?
The question is not as fanciful as it might appear.1 Cloning is a
possible method for "reproduction." For some people, cloning would
undoubtedly be the preferred choice. Among this group, some would
choose cloning on the ground that it is the only way to produce
children with some genetic connection to them. For such people, the
potential value of cloning should not be understated. And because
reproduction is involved, the individual right to choose might well be
thought to fall within the doctrinal protection given by Roe v. Wade
and other cases. At the same time, it is not clear that the government
can offer constitutionally adequate grounds for interfering with a
Some of the most common
presumptively protected right.
justifications seem speculative, and others could be taken care of
through narrower means, falling short of a flat ban on cloning.
Indeed, the justifications for banning cloning might wel seem, at first
glance, to be weaker than the justifications for banning abortion,
which involves the intentional destruction of what many people
* Karl N. Llewellyn, Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. This essay is a written version of
the keynote luncheon address for the Hastings Law Journal symposium on human cloning,
held on January 26,2002.
1. See John Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1371,
1441-42 (1998).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); Carey v. Population Servs., 431 U.S. 113 (1973).
[987]
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consider innocent human life. If government cannot ban the
intentional destruction of human life, why-it might be asked-is
government allowed to forbid the intentional creation of human life?
Notwithstanding these points, I will argue here that under
existing law, there is no constitutional right to clone for reproductive
purposes, and indeed that the argument for such a right is quite weak
under the law as it now stands. I will also argue that there is no
constitutional right to clone for therapeutic purposes, though the
analysis must be quite different from that in the reproductive context.
In the process of engaging the legal issues, I will offer a few more
general remarks as well. Some of those remarks involve the
appropriate judicial posture in cases involving "substantive due
process." I will suggest that it is desirable for courts to be extremely
cautious in extending the reach of cases that do not involve an
element involving inequality or some other kind of failure from the
democratic point of view. Judicial caution is justified in light of the
complexity of the underlying scientific issues and the existence of a
reasonable debate over the questions of policy and value. These are
institutional points about the sense of a general posture of judicial
deference in a situation of this sort.
But some of my remarks bear on the general question whether
government should, in principle, ban reproductive and therapeutic
cloning. I do not mean to resolve those questions here, but I will
suggest that many of the most commonly offered arguments are
extremely weak, resting as they do on a mixture of ignorance and
confusion. With respect to nonreproductive cloning, the argument
for a presumptive constitutional right is strained under the
precedents; but ironically, the government's justifications for
intruding on freedom of choice are very weak indeed. Here, as
elsewhere, we should distinguish sharply between the legal question
and the political question.
The suggestion that there is no
constitutional right to clone does not say whether a reasonable
legislature would ban the practice of cloning; and in the context of
therapeutic cloning, we shall see many reasons for doubt. At the very
least, we should distinguish between the strongest justifications, now
involving the doubtful safety of the procedure, and the weaker
justifications, based on mistakes of fact or simple distaste.
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I. Reproductive Cloning: Is There a Presumptively
Protected Right?
For purposes of substantive due process, the first question is
whether the right to clone counts as a fundamental one, with which
the government can interfere only to protect a "compelling" interest.
If there is no fundamental right, the government is required merely 4to
meet.
show a "rational basis" for its action, a much easier burden to
A

Puzzling Pattern

This is not the simplest question to answer. The Supreme Court
has not-to say the least-given clear criteria for deciding when a
right qualifies for special constitutional protection. The cases leave a
great deal of ambiguity and the doctrine lacks much coherence.5
There are two common ways of reading the cases. One reading is that
the Court has issued a firm "this far, and no more" and is unwilling to
recognize additional fundamental rights unless they find specific and
extremely strong recognition in Anglo-American traditions. Chief
Justice Rehnquist appeared to accept this argument for a majority of
the Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg.6 This approach
most certainly would not see cloning as a presumptively protected
right. The other reading is that the cases should be taken to establish
a presumptive right to noninterference with decisions that are highly
personal and intimate, at least if those decisions involve choices about
sexuality and reproduction. This approach might well require strong
government justification for any interference with an individual
decision to clone. I explore the two approaches in sequence.
B. Due Process Traditionalism
On occasion, influential Justices and the Court as a whole have
said that fundamental rights qualify as such largely because of their
origins in Anglo-American traditions, understood at a level of
considerable specificity.7 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
Court in Glucksberg8 draws upon this theme, though Justice
O'Connor's separate and narrower opinion places its status into
4. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
5. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
6. 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (upholding ban on physician-assisted suicide).
7. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n. 6 (1989) (plurality opinion of
Scalia, J.); Bowers, 478 U.S. 186; Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
(plurality opinion of Powell, J.); Griswold,381 U.S. 479 (Harlan, J., concurring).
8. 521 U.S. at 710.
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doubt.9 A central goal of due process traditionalism is to discipline
judicial discretion and to draw upon views that are time-honored and
therefore unlikely to be idiosyncratic.
Let us for the moment assume that due process traditionalism is
correct-that it describes the appropriate approach to the due process
clause. If the right to clone must emerge from such traditions, the
case is simple: There is no such right. The right to clone is not
something that Anglo-American law traditionally protects. Of
course, we could say that the absence of a tradition of protection is
not relevant, because the relevant technology is so new. But if such a
tradition is a necessary condition for constitutional protection, there
can be no right to clone.
But there are severe problems with defining fundamental
interests solely by reference to tradition, specifically described. The
first problem is that many of the Court's cases cannot be understood
in purely traditionalist terms, and hence the traditionalist
understanding of the privacy cases fits poorly with existing law. Roe
v. Wade presents the clearest example; there is no clear tradition
establishing a right to abortion. But this is not true only of abortion.
The cases establishing a right to contraceptives outside of marriage do
not vindicate a longstanding tradition.0 Nor is there any general right
to marry within Anglo-American traditions; hence Loving v.
Virginia," striking down a ban on interracial marriage under the due
process clause, and Zablocki v. Redhail'2 recognizing a fundamental
right to marry, fit poorly with due process traditionalism. Traditions,
taken at a level of specificity and as brute facts, explain few of the key
cases, and hence traditionalism does not make sense of existing law.
Should the Court consider its own decisions doubtful and use
traditionalism in the future notwithstanding its inconsistency with
past decisions? This course has considerable support within the
Court; it is suggested by the Court's opinion in Washington v.
Glucksberg, the plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., and
Bowers v. Hardwick.3 And such a course might be deemed
reasonable if traditionalism was extremely appealing in principle and
if the alternatives were unacceptable. Perhaps a firm "no more!"
would make sense despite its failure to fit with existing law; the
9. Id. at 736-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
10. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Carey v. Population Servs., 431 U.S.
113 (1973).
11. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
12. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
13. 521 U.S. at 702; 491 U.S. 110 (1997); 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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Court's occasionally cavalier treatment of its own precedents implies
a judgment of this sort. But if we assume that at least some kind of
substantive due process is legitimate,'4 as all of the Justices appear to
assume, we will find large problems with using traditions, narrowly
and specifically conceived, as the sole source of rights under the due
process clause. To be sure, such a use of tradition does help to
discipline judicial discretion, and that is an important gain. If
traditions were extremely reliable as sources of rights, and if judges
thinking more independently about the appropriate scope of rights
were systematically unreliable, due process traditionalism might be
justified on balance. That is, due process traditionalism might be
justified as a way of minimizing the costs of decision and aggregate
judicial errors even if it were quite imperfect as a source of rights.
But this is not a very plausible view, for there is no reason to
think that traditions, understood at a level of great specificity, are
systematically reliable or so close to systematically reliable as to
exclude a somewhat more reflective and critical judicial role." AngloAmerican traditions include a great deal of good but also significant
confusion and injustice (consider, for example, bans on racial
intermarriage); it is sensible for courts to engage in a degree of critical
scrutiny of intrusions on liberty even if those intrusions do not offend
tradition. Nor is there sufficient reason to think that judges will
inevitably do very badly if they think critically about rights.
Of course, judges should be very cautious about rejecting
judgments made by elected officials; judges should also avoid hubris
in examining the past. Certainly it is plausible to think that judges
should generally proceed incrementally and in good common law
fashion from previous decisions. It also makes sense to say that
substantive due process should be used sparingly, because of its
uncertain textual basis and because of the unreliability of judicial
judgments about which rights should qualify as fundamental.
Understandings of this kind provide important constraints on judicial
power under the Due Process Clause. But at the very least it is
appropriate for courts to ask whether the interest said to qualify as a
fundamental right is, in principle, at all different from rights that have
14. Actually the whole idea of "substantive due process" is quite doubtful as a matter
of text and history. But we might see that idea as doing the work of the privileges and
immunities clause, which could plausibly have been used for an enterprise of this kind.
See Charles Fairman, Does the FourteenthAmendment Incorporatethe Bill of Rights?, 2
STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
15. I try to defend this view in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT
CONSTITUTIONS Do (2001).
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been sanctified by tradition. If, for example, there were no relevant
difference, in principle, between a traditionally-unrecognized right to
clone and (let us suppose) a traditionally-recognized right to use
contraceptives within marriage, courts should not say that the latter is
constitutionally protected and the former is not.
To make the point more vivid, assume that a state banned the
use of all reproductive technologies, requiring all reproduction to
occur the old-fashioned way. For many couples, the consequence of
such a ban would be to prevent reproduction at all. It would seem
sensible, in a case of that sort, to require the state to justify its action
in highly persuasive terms.
In short: If tradition is the exclusive basis for special protection
under the due process clause, then the right to clone cannot possibly
qualify for such protection. But there are good reasons to question
the idea that tradition should be the exclusive basis for this special
protection.
C. Reproduction and Sexuality

If tradition is not decisive, what is the source of fundamental
rights for purposes of substantive due process?
(1) An IlluminatingFalse Start

It is tempting to resort to terms such as "intimate" and
"personal"; but these terms provide little help. They tend to be
conclusions masquerading as analytic devices. In any case, some of
the cases deny protection to interests that seem highly intimate and
highly personal; consider both Hardwick,6 refusing to recognize a
right to homosexual sodomy, and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,7

refusing to recognize an associational right to enable people to live
together. Thus, the Court's cases refuse to accept the view that
intimate and personal decisions deserve constitutional protection as
such. Putting previous cases to one side, we can see that some
seemingly intimate and personal decisions are not strong candidates
for constitutional protection. Consider the decision to work longer
than the maximum hour laws allow in order to provide for one's
family, the decision to take medicines or drugs of a certain sort, the
decision to marry one's cousin or aunt, or for that matter the decision
to commit suicide. There is good reason to think that the
Constitution does not protect these decisions, however intimate and
16. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
17. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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personal they seem. For this reason, a reference to "intimacy" or
"personal" decisions is insufficiently helpful.
(2) Reproductionand Sexuality

But the Court could find a narrower principle of some appeal,
and considerable consistency with the cases, if it said that there is a
presumptive right against government intrusionsinto the decision how
and whether to produce children. This idea might be invoked to
explain both Roe v. Wade and cases involving governmental efforts to
prevent people from diminishing risks of pregnancy. The suggested
standard also has the advantage of distinguishing Bowers v. Hardwick
on the ground that there is no prohibition on the regulation of sexual
conduct if decisions about pregnancy and childbirth are not involved.
In any event, the standard seems to provide a sufficient if not
necessary condition for constitutional concern. There do not appear
to be any cases that fail to find a constitutionally protected interest in
cases in which the standard is met.
(3) Problemsand Difficulties
It would not be frivolous to take the precedents in this way. 8 But
there are two problems with the argument.
The first is that it is not clear why the right to decide how and
whether to produce children should have this special status, if other
rights, such as the right to choose physician-assisted suicide and the
right to engage in consensual sexual activities, do not. 9 Surely it is
true that decisions about reproduction-about whether and how to
reproduce-are central to individual autonomy. But many other
decisions seem equally central, or at least not less central, and those
decisions do not receive special constitutional protection. Why
should reproduction be singled out? The question suggests that the
cases involving reproduction and contraception may not, in fact, only
involve those issues, and that they may be marked by another feature,
one that involves sex equality. Perhaps issues of that kind also helped
motivate the Court. A ban on abortion has disproportionate effects
on women, to say the least; and when a law forbids the use of
contraceptives, women are likely to face especially strong adverse
effects, in the form of an involuntary pregnancy. Indeed, several
members of the Court have acknowledged that Roe v. Wade owes
18. As the district court seemed to in Lifchez v. Hartgan, 735 F. Supp. 1365 (N.D. Ill.
1990), rev'd sub nom. Scholberg v. Lifchez, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990).
19. Hardwick,478 U.S. at 186; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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something to equality concerns, 20 and it does seem clear that bans on
contraception have disproportionate effects on women.
This equality concern does not appear to be present with bans on
cloning. Do such bans treat women worse than men? Do such bans
treat any disadvantaged group especially badly? To be sure, it would
be possible to urge that people who are disabled, in the sense that
they lack the ability to produce children in the standard fashion, are
distinctly harmed by bans on cloning. But whenever the government
imposes barriers on the use of some medicine or medical technology,
there is a disproportionate burden on those who believe that they
need it. By itself that burden is not enough to create a serious
constitutional issue.
The second problem in the argument is that it defines the
relevant interests very broadly, and in a way that is not at all
compelled by the cases. People might have a right to decide whether
to abort, and whether to use contraceptives, without also having a
right to choose any available means to have, or not to have, a childeven if that means is, for some people, the only realistic means. We
should agree that it would be presumptively unacceptable for the
government to ban certain couples from having children, or to impose
a one-child policy on the nation. We should also agree that the
government may not require people to have children, and indeed that
government may not bar women from availing themselves of what is,
for most people, the usually indispensable means of preventing the
birth of unwanted children (such as contraception and abortion). But
none of this means that there is a presumptive right to do whatever
might be done to increase the likelihood of having, or not having, a
child: to enter into surrogacy arrangements, or to use in vitro
fertilization, or to attempt to clone a child. The central point is that a
ban on cloning, or on surrogacy arrangements, leaves open numerous
other channels by which most people may bear a child. If numerous
channels remain open, perhaps the government need not face the
strongest possible burden when it merely closes off one.
The point should not be overstated. There are many means to
prevent unwanted childbirth (I omit the details); abortion and
contraception are hardly the only methods. And for some people,
cloning might be the only feasible way to produce a biological
offspring. It would certainly not be ludicrous to say that as a matter
of constitutional law, the state has to produce a strong justification for
intruding on that choice in cases in which it is the only realistic option.
20. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 933 (1992).
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Indeed, there is reason to question a doctrine that would apply strict
scrutiny to a ban on "natural" reproductive practices while applying
only deferential review to a ban on new technologies. But where
there is no problem of inequality, courts would probably not, and
should probably not, demand the kind of overwhelming justification
that is required in some cases. Indeed, it seems sensible to
understand the Court's precedents as reflecting special circumstances:
the potentially large intrusion on women's bodies that is entailed by a
ban on abortion or contraception, and the fact that when such bans
are in place, women's equality is at risk.
1. Reproductive Cloning: State Justifications
I now turn to the arguments that might be offered to justify a ban
on reproductive cloning. These arguments can be taken in two ways.
First, they might be an effort to show that the government has a
rational basis for the ban-all that is required if, as I believe, a
fundamental right is not involved. Second, they might be invoked to
show that government has a compelling interest in banning
reproductive cloning-the showing that is required under strict
scrutiny. My basic conclusion is that most of the arguments, and
perhaps even all of them, are sufficient to satisfy rational basis review.
I also urge that if a compelling interest must be shown, the most
stringent standard is met by the significant risk that cloning would
result in a greater deal of illness, suffering, and death.
A. Three Weak Arguments
(1) Moral Repugnance

In a widely discussed article, Leon Kass has pointed to what he
calls the "wisdom" of repugnance, and urged that disgust or
repugnance is by itself a sufficient reason to ban a practice. 21 There is
an interesting claim in the background here. Perhaps repugnance,
even of the visceral sort, reflects a kind of wisdom and rationality that
are superior to readily accessible arguments.
But is moral
repugnance, felt by many people, enough to meet the government's
burden?
The Supreme Court has indicated that it is, at least in the context
of a prohibition of homosexual sodomy.' And undoubtedly it is true
21. See Leon Kass, The Wisdom in Repugnance, in CLONING: FOR AND AGAINST
(1998).
22. See 478 U.S. at 196.
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that "disgust" sometimes captures a sound moral intuition and that on
reflection, we will find that moral repugnance is based on good
grounds. Sometimes repugnance is fully rational. But standing by
itself, and not subject to reason or scrutiny, moral repugnance seems
to be a weak basis for intruding on a human choice, no matter what
the Court said in Hardwick.2 Moral repugnance has been invoked for
many bans that could not easily withstand analysis; consider
prohibitions on racial intermarriage or masturbation. In the context
of cloning, moral repugnance might well be a response to vaguely
remembered science fiction stories or horror movies, or to
perceptions based on ignorance and confusion (as in the idea that a
clone is a complete "copy" of the original, or a "copy" that is going to
be evil). The real task is to see if moral repugnance can be defended,
not simply asserted.
But these points remain to be translated into constitutional
terms. If we are speaking of strict scrutiny, moral repugnance by
itself cannot be sufficient; Loving v. Virgini24 is enough to establish
the point. Moral repugnance must be explained, not merely asserted.
But if rational basis review is at work, and if the task is merely to
describe current law, moral repugnance does seem adequate under
the authority of Bowers v. Hardwick. At the same time, there is every
reason to be uneasy with this conclusion. Indeed, in the context of
discrimination against the mentally retarded, offense and repugnance
were expressly found to be irrational and hence constitutionally
inadequate.' To uphold a ban on reproductive cloning, we should
seek some other rationale, even under the rational basis test.
(2) Lessening the Worth of Individualsand ThreateningIndividuality
Would cloning lessen the worth of individuals? Would it make
the clone less of an individual? The person whose genetic materials
were used? Would it diminish the uniqueness of human identity?
Some people think so. No less an authority than Ian Wilmut has said,
"I think that each child should be treated as an individual; and if you

23. A possible view would be that moral repugnance is enough to support a law that is
challenged on due process clause grounds, but that it is not enough to support a law that is
challenged on equal protection grounds. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473
U.S. 432 (1985). This view might be supported on the ground that the due process clause
is rooted in tradition, and hence traditional repugnance is adequate, whereas the equal
protection clause is not rooted in tradition, and hence traditional repugnance is
inadequate.
24. 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
25. CleburneLiving Ctr., 473 U.S. at 448.
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have chosen to make a child, who is a copy of someone who is already
here, you can't possibly treat that person as an individual."26 My

speculation is that for many people, the idea of "copying" human
beings is unacceptable, simply because of what it seems to do to the
individuals involved.
Here too, however, the argument seems to dissolve on
reflection. Wilmut is making an empirical claim ("you can't possibly
treat that person as an individual"), and taken as such, the claim is
very weak. Identical twins are genetically identical, and the existence
of identical twins does not lessen the worth of individuals, or make
anyone less of an individual. If John and Jim are genetically the
same, they are likely to be similar in many ways for that very reason;
but they will not be identical, simply because they will have different
experiences, and experiences affect personality and development. It
is not necessary to set out controversial claims about the precise mix
of genetic endowments and environment in order to make the point.
The individuality of the person whose DNA is used to create a clone
would not be compromised by the fact; nor would the individuality of
the clone be affected as a result." Indeed, the difference between
cloning and ordinary reproduction should not be overstated on this
count. Many children are extremely close, as a genetic matter, to one
or another parent.
If we are speaking of strict scrutiny, a ban on cloning cannot
plausibly be defended on this ground. Because rational basis review
is so deferential, the individuality argument might well be sufficient to
support a ban. But even here, the argument is extremely shaky.
(3) Genetic Diversity

A species does well if it has a large stock of genetic diversity.
Some people who are concerned about human cloning fear that if it
occurs, the stock will be diminished-making the world, or parts of it,
a bit like the English royal family. If this is a plausible threat,
wouldn't it be legitimate for a state or a nation to ban cloning for that
reason alone?
On reflection, this too is an extremely weak argument, certainly
insufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny, and probably insufficient to
satisfy rational basis review. The reason is simple: it simply defies
belief to suggest that cloning would become so popular as to reduce,
in any significant way, the existing level of genetic diversity.
26. CNN Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, June 24,1997).
27. Below I address some psychological complications.
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Three Stronger Arguments

(1) ProtectingAgainst Suffering and Early Death

The first and simplest justification, of the stronger ones, is that in
light of the current state of medical technology, it is highly likely that
cloned human beings would face serious medical problems-leading,
in many cases, to serious illness and early death.' The underlying
risks include high rates of miscarriage, deformed children, premature
aging, and high rates of cancer and other diseases." There are
possible risks to the mother as well.'
Let us assume that this pessimistic account of the current
situation is accurate as a scientific matter. If it is true, it should be
easily sufficient to satisfy rational basis review. Indeed, it is probably
sufficient to satisfy even the most stringent standard of review,
though under that standard, the scientific claims would be
investigated closely. If the claims are taken to be adequate-as
prominent groups have concluded 31-then a ban is likely to be upheld
even if the consequence is to prevent the development of technology
that would reduce the relevant risks. By hypothesis, the practice of
cloning would lead to much suffering and many deaths. The
government would therefore have strong reason to prevent that
practice. Compare the question of animal welfare. If scientists are
experimenting with animals in a way that will lead to a great deal of
suffering, the government is certainly allowed to intervene, even if the
experiments would have many benefits too.
There is, however, a possible counter-argument. Roe v. Wade
held that the interest in protecting fetal life is not sufficient to
override the right of privacy.32 Suppose that many or most of the
early deaths would involve fetuses, not viable human beings. Is it not
clear, after Roe, that the interest in protecting fetal life cannot
overcome the right to choose? The simplest answer is that strict
scrutiny is likely not to be involved, and hence the interest in
protecting fetal life is indeed sufficient. A slightly less simple answer
is that in light of current technology, a ban on cloning would protect
fetuses, young children, and mothers themselves, and hence the
question turns out to be easy after all. If we are speaking of strict
28. See REP. OF THE CAL. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUM. CLONING, CLONING
CALIFORNIANS?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1145. (2002) [hereinafter CLONING CALIFORNIANS?].
29.
30.
31.
32.

See id.; see also Robertson, supra note 1, at 1411.
See CLONING CALIFORNIANS?, supra note 28, at 1164-68.
See id.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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scrutiny, the best answer is that a ban on cloning is justified as an
effort to protect not only fetuses, but also people who are actually
born. Even if a relatively small percentage of clones (10%? 20%?)
would suffer in the predicted way, the state almost certainly has
sufficient reason, as a constitutional matter, to ban the practice.
(2) PsychologicalHarm to the Clone
It is possible to urge that the clone would suffer psychological
harm, even psychological trauma. Imagine the likely emotional state
of someone who knows that he or she is genetically identical to
someone who has already lived a number of years. Perhaps such a
person would believe that her future course was in many ways
preordained-that some possibilities were open and others were
closed off. If the clone's genetic equivalent suffered from high blood
pressure, or diabetes, or cancer, she might believe, with very good
reason, that she would face those problems as well. Other problems
are more subtle. If the genetically identical parent faced a depressing
career path, or had unappealing physical features or an unpleasant
smile or laugh, or was severely overweight, it might prove difficultfar worse than distressing-for the clone.
These are hardly implausible concerns, but they do involve a
degree of speculation. We do not know whether in most or many
cases, the psychological harms would be serious. Identical twins
appear to do very well notwithstanding the fact that psychological
harm could be predicted in the abstract. To be sure, the case of
human cloning would be different, simply because of the age
difference between the people involved; the harms I am discussing
would be a product of seeing a life that has run much of its course.
But biology is not (entirely) destiny, and we could easily imagine
young people concluding that even if they are genetically equivalent
to one or another parent, or some other living person, their path is
hardly foreordained. Is cloning so radically different, on this count,
from ordinary reproduction? I am not sure.
As far as the Constitution is concerned, however, the issue will
be resolved by selection of the governing standard. If the rational
basis test is involved, the arguments from psychological harm are
undoubtedly sufficient. If strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard,
the speculative nature of the argument is probably decisive, and the
ban could not be defended on this ground alone.

1000
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(3) Use and Exploitationof Human Beings

Of the stronger arguments for banning reproductive cloning, the
third is the most interesting. Imagine a situation in which cloning was
freely permitted-in which individuals could clone themselves, and in
which people interested in children with a certain genetic endowment
could assure themselves of that very endowment. If a family wanted a
terrific athlete, it could obtain a genetic equivalent of, say, Michael
Jordan; if it wanted a terrific musician, it could obtain a genetic
equivalent of, say, Bob Dylan; if it wanted a terrific scientist, it could
obtain a genetic equivalent of, say, Ian Wilmut; if it wanted a terrific
philosopher, it could clone John Rawls. Why would this be
objectionable? The reason is that people would be treating their
children-to-be as means, with prearranged agendas, rather than as
ends, to seek their own path. Someone who seeks a clone of Michael
Jordan might well have a particular plan in mind for that individual.
So too with anyone who has sought, and been able, to choose people
with one or another genetic endowment. In such cases, the parents
would be carefully programming their children's future, and likely,
perhaps, to keep the program in mind throughout childhood.
Of course this is not altogether different from ordinary life.
Many parents have particular plans for their children. Many parents
are insistent on those plans. Sperm and egg donations depend, in
part, on perceptions about genetic endowments. But the particular
programming that I am now discussing cannot be achieved. Perhaps
parents who produce clones will, too much of the time, treat their
own children not as ends but as means.3 If we see a significant
increase in that kind of treatment, there would seem to be
considerable reason for concern.
Is this an adequate justification, by itself, for banning cloning? If
the rational basis test is at work, it certainly is; and for reasons
suggested above, rational basis should be all that should be required
here. But if we probe a bit more deeply, we will uncover some
complexities. The argument depends on a speculation about what
people would do, and we do not know if the speculation can be
supported. Perhaps most people would clone themselves, or would
seek clones of strangers who meet some genetic minimum, and would
not attempt to clone particular individuals with particular traits and
career paths. Perhaps this would be rare. Probably those who cloned
people with particular characteristics would, almost all of the time,

33. Robertson, supra note 1, at 1418.
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treat their children with love and respect. Here, as elsewhere, strict
scrutiny is not easy to satisfy, and here, as elsewhere, a widespread
argument against human cloning seems to rest on weak grounds.
I1. Therapeutic Cloning
Therapeutic cloning presents quite different issues.' Here there
is no effort to create actual human beings. Children are not involved.
My basic conclusion is that it is not at all easy to argue that there is a
fundamental right to engage in therapeutic cloning-indeed, the
argument for that right is weaker, as a legal matter, than the
argument for a right to engage in reproductive cloning. On the other
hand, the justifications for banning therapeutic cloning are also
relatively weak-much weaker, in fact, than the strongest
justifications for banning reproductive cloning. To understand the
constitutional issues associated with a ban on therapeutic cloning, a
brief background is in order.
A. A (Very) Little Science

Here, in brief, is how therapeutic cloning would work. An
embryo would be created and allowed to grow for a short period,
perhaps fourteen days. Its stem cells would then be extracted and
grown into human tissue or a complete human organ for transplant.
The result of the process would not be a human being, but a piece of
nerve tissue, or a replacement organ, or a certain amount of skin.
The goal would be to grow replacement organs from a sample of
someone's DNA.
It is not clear if and when therapeutic cloning will succeed, but
the potential benefits are enormous. In theory, people could receive
perfectly matched replacement organs, with little or no danger of
rejection of the transplant. Insulin-secreting cells could be used to
treat diabetes; nerve cells could be used for Parkinson's disease or
strokes; liver cells could be used to repair damaged organs. There
would be no need to wait for the death of a donor. Nonreproductive
cloning could also produce significant benefits for knowledge and
research, with eventual medical advances as well.
B.

No Fundamental Right
Is there a fundamental right to engage in therapeutic cloning?

The issue is quite different from the case of reproductive cloning, for
34. As recognized in national and California reports on the point. See supra note 28.
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childbirth is not in any sense involved. Hence the precedents that
might support a right to reproductive cloning cannot be invoked here.
For constitutional purposes, the central question is whether there is a
presumptive right to select medical treatments. Those who seek to
engage in therapeutic cloning might be protected if the Constitution
recognizes such a presumptive right. We can imagine patients, or
derivatively scientists and researchers, urging that the right to privacy
includes a presumptive right to noninterference with choices among
medical treatments that are crucial to people's well-being.
At first glance, however, the mere statement of the question
serves as an answer. No Supreme Court decision suggests that there
is any such right. Indeed, daily practice argues against its existence.
The Food and Drug Administration controls the kinds of medicines
that doctors may prescribe and that patients may choose. It would be
fanciful to attack those controls on constitutional grounds. Now
perhaps it could be urged that in the relevant cases, the FDA is
attempting to protect people against fraud or deception, or against
the effects of their own ignorance, and that these are not the grounds
for forbidding nonreproductive cloning. Probably this is true. But
the key point is that the FDA is not required to justify its decisions in
the terms of strict scrutiny, on pain of constitutional invalidation.
We have seen that it is not implausible to argue, on the strength
of Roe v. Wade, that the government would be required to produce a
strong justification for any effort to ban in vitro fertilization or
surrogacy arrangements. But nothing in Roe v. Wade supports the
right to choose medical treatments. Recall that the Court has upheld
a ban on physician-assisted suicide, applying rational basis review. 5 If
people do not have a right to choose death, it is unlikely that they
have a right to a particular set of medical experiments that might
ultimately benefit them. Or consider another analogy: scientific
experiments on animals. Must the government justify a limitation on
such experiments in the terms of strict scrutiny, simply because
important medical advances might result? This is most doubtful. No
court has ever suggested that strict scrutiny will apply to government
efforts to protect animals in the process of experimentation.
I do not mean to suggest that the area lacks complexities.
Perhaps it could be argued that while there is no right to die, there is
a right to live, and that when a patient seeks to use medical
technology that is the (only) means of saving his life, that the
government should be required to produce an unusually convincing
35. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,735 (1997).
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justification. This is not entirely implausible. But it would go well
beyond the existing precedents, and it would also have the
disadvantage of requiring careful judicial oversight of numerous
decisions by the FDA. One of my general themes has been the value
of judicial deference, under the due process clause, in the face of
complex disputes of fact and value. A posture of deference makes
best sense here as elsewhere. 6
C.

Elusive Justifications
What interests support a ban on therapeutic cloning? The answer
is not simple. Those who object to therapeutic cloning tend to believe
that personhood begins at conception, and that the state should not
use "persons" for the benefit of others. Is this an adequate
justification? In the case of rational basis review?
It might be tempting to say that this justification is inadequate
after Roe v. Wade. In Roe, after all, the Court held that the interest in
protecting fetal life was not sufficient to justify a ban on abortion.
But the temptation should be resisted. Roe holds only that the
interest in protecting fetal life is inadequate to override the woman's
right to choose; it does not hold that the interest is illegitimate or
weightless. It seems clear that government can make it a crime for
third parties to kill first-trimester fetuses, whether they are inside
women's wombs or in the laboratory; and to justify such a
prohibition, it is not necessary for government to say that firsttrimester fetuses are human beings.
But what is the reason for forbidding nonreproductive cloning?
Those who object to therapeutic cloning may be unsure whether
personhood begins at conception, but may nonetheless press two
points. First, they may think that the use of human pre-embryos is
itself a moral wrong. Second, they may urge that the use of human
embryos could tend to have subtle but ultimately corrosive effects on
human values, in ways that will lead to an assortment of problems-a
point that might seem especially powerful in light of the prospect of
"embryo factories." If rational basis review is at work, these points
should be sufficient to support the ban as a matter of constitutional
law. But I am not sure whether to endorse the claims in principle.
Why is it a moral wrong to use pre-embryos in the suggested way?
Animals are frequently used as means; most of these uses are lawful,
and at least some of them seem morally acceptable. Do pre-embryos
36. I do not discuss the question whether there is a first amendment right to engage in
medical or scientific research. The law is ill-developed on this point.
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have such a strong claim to protection? Or consider the view that
human values will be corroded by nonreproductive cloning. Why,
exactly, should this be feared, if nonreproductive cloning is not itself
morally wrong for the purposes and in the circumstances I am
describing? The empirical claim seems most doubtful. If the relevant
"embryo factories" really involve tiny cell combinations, is the
problem so serious?
Perhaps the strongest ground for banning nonreproductive
cloning has nothing to do with these points. Perhaps it is a different
sort of empirical claim, to the effect that a ban on nonreproductive
cloning is a necessary means for enforcing the ban on reproductive
cloning. It might be feared that if nonreproductive cloning is
permitted, some people, at some point, will inevitably use the preembryos in the forbidden way, so as to produce, or to try to produce,
children. Here too, there are many doubts. If reproductive cloning is
a crime, should we really fear that nonreproductive cloning would be
used for that by-hypothesis unlawful end? But if rational basis review
is at work, this justification should be sufficient.
Conclusion
This has been a lawyer's essay, exploring the constitutional issue,
not the question of policy. I have argued that bans on cloning are
constitutional, not that they are a good idea.
With respect to substantive due process, I have offered a general
claim. The Court should be most reluctant to invoke the due process
clause to strike down legislation on substantive grounds. Where the
Court has acted, it has usually done so because of an implicit
understanding that the case did not simply involve substantive due
process. In cases involving sexuality and reproduction, a question of
sex equality was also involved. The argument for a cautious approach
to the due process clause depends in part on a belief that the idea of
"substantive due process" is awkward as a matter of text and history.
But it also depends on a belief in judicial fallibility, especially in the
domain of complex facts and contested values. Simply because of its
complexity, the area of cloning is a prime arena for judicial deference.
Unless there is some problem in the process that led to the law under
review, courts should be hesitant to interpose their own views, at least
outside of the most egregious cases. Tradition is indeed relevant
here, at least as a way of undertaking the inquiry into egregiousness;
an unprecedented intrusion is likely to be especially egregious.
Tradition does not exhaust the substantive content of the due process
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clause. But the intrusion marked by bans on cloning does not rise to
the level of intrusions the Court has marked for invalidation; and that
is sufficient for my basic conclusion here.
I have argued that there is no constitutional right to clone human
beings for reproductive purposes, and hence a ban on cloning, for
those purposes, would and should be upheld. I have also argued that
there is no constitutional right to clone human beings for therapeutic
purposes. In both cases, the Constitution does not create a
presumptively protected right-and thus the government is not
required to show more than a rational justification for its actions. In
both cases, the government has such a justification. In the case of
reproductive cloning, the best argument is the least sectarian-that a
ban is necessary to protect against human suffering. In the case of
therapeutic cloning, a ban is far harder to justify. But so long as
rationality review is at work, it is probably sufficient to say that the
ban on therapeutic cloning is a means of making the ban on
reproductive cloning effective.
At the same time, the analysis has shown that many of the
standard objections to human cloning are extremely weak. Some of
those objections depend on ignorance and confusion, or on a kind of
half-remembered message from old science fiction movies. By itself,
repugnance should not be, in principle, an adequate justification for
law. An unintended by-product of a discussion of the constitutional
issue may be to take some small steps toward something that is long
overdue and much needed in the political arena: A disaggregation of
the issues that are involved in reproductive and nonreproductive
cloning, and a separation of the diverse, sometimes strong, but
sometimes implausible grounds that are invoked on behalf of
statutory bans in both domains.

